Sometimes Enemies, Sometimes Friends by Gundermann, Christopher David
W&M ScholarWorks 
Undergraduate Honors Theses Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 
4-2019 
Sometimes Enemies, Sometimes Friends 
Christopher David Gundermann 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/honorstheses 
 Part of the American Politics Commons, International Relations Commons, Models and Methods 
Commons, and the Political Theory Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gundermann, Christopher David, "Sometimes Enemies, Sometimes Friends" (2019). Undergraduate 
Honors Theses. Paper 1273. 
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/honorstheses/1273 
This Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at 
W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Undergraduate Honors Theses by an authorized 
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
Thesis: Sometimes Enemies, Sometimes Friends
Christopher Gundermann
College of William & Mary
April 23, 2019
Abstract
Political polarization and the growing power of the presidency have created new incentives
for political actors in the realm of foreign policy that have not existed prior in American his-
tory. I argue that these new incentives in formulating foreign policy has created repeating
and predictable trends in how America relates to various regime types (here meaning all ruling
governments, regardless of political system) due to shared ideological concerns. The foreign
policy pushed by the Democratic Party places emphasis on democratization and human rights
in the post-September 11th period, which leads to improved relations between America and like-
minded liberal left-leaning regimes. Similarly, Republican Party foreign policy, which prioritizes
security above democratization and human rights promotion, allows for improved ties between
America and like-minded right-leaning regimes. Through examining the case studies of Amer-
ican relations with Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines in the post-September
11th period, I find that American relations with liberal democracies - Indonesia, the Philippines
pre-Duterte - improved with the Obama administration’s foreign policy, and have worsened
under the Bush and Trump foreign policies. Likewise, American relations with authoritarian
nations - Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines under an increasingly-brazen Duterte - have
improved with Republican Party foreign policy, especially in the areas related to security at the
cost of democratization efforts and human rights promotion.
Keywords: Polarization, Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Democratization, Authoritarianism
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Introduction
What dynamics drive U.S. cooperation with nations? Why does the U.S. cooperate more efficiently
and less acrimoniously with some nations than others? While some might answer that necessity
is the reason - for instance, we disapprove of the actions of Saudi Arabia, yet hold our noses due
to their value as a regional ally - I would suggest that the reason for cooperation is ideological
similarity. The closest allies of the United States - Canada, Germany, Australia, Britain - are
all liberal democracies much like ourselves. Comparatively, the United States’ greatest enemies -
Russia, China, and North Korea amidst others - tend to be varying shades of authoritarian. This
ideological difference leads to different foreign policy priorities - for instance, supporting the spread
of democracy is a priority for liberal democracies, but not authoritarian China - and inherent
suspicion over the sheer ‘ideological difference’ separating the United States from other, less liberal
and democratic countries.
But why now is the United States increasing military cooperation with communist Vietnam,
or coup-ridden Thailand? Why is Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, a notorious human rights
abuser who has murdered thousands of his own people and came under withering criticism from
President Obama now showered with effusive praise by President Trump? The latter has gone so
far as to say, “I just wanted to congratulate you because I am hearing of the unbelievable job on
the drug problem” (Wojcik, 2017).
This is not to claim that the president is the sole creator and arbiter of foreign policy, but the
presidency has amassed the majority of power in the foreign policy process and typically, if his
party has control of congress, can pursue foreign policy as he or she sees fit. If congress and the
presidency are controlled by the same party, other institutions, such as the State Department and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff almost always follow the president’s lead. This is doubly true in today’s
era of homogenization within the two separate parties.
Consequently, this paper argues that political polarization has drastically increased in American
in the post-September 11th period, and this polarization has created several separate paths for
American foreign policy, each persued by one of the two main American political parties. Relations
between the United States and other countries change in predictable ways due to this increase
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in domestic American political homogenization and the other country’s regime type. This paper
focuses on Southeast Asia for evidence due to its political diversity and geopolitical variation, as
well as relative American neglect until recent years. This dynamic is important as Southeast Asia
was, in effect, a comparatively blank slate for U.S. foreign policy since the end of the Vietnam war
until President Bush identified the region as a second front in his War on Terror. This pushed the
region to the fore of U.S. foreign policy.
That America’s relations with another country might change due to that country’s regime
type is not news in and of itself. However, domestic partisan pressures determining the nation’s
foreign policy toward another country is a new, and troubling, trend. The period this paper
examines - America’s foreign policy post-September 11th 2001 is a unique period of change, both in
America’s foreign policy priorities (the War on Terror, the war in Afghanistan, a focus on security for
the homeland) and in American politics (due to increased and nationalized political polarization
combined with increasing power over the executive branch over foreign policy). Democrats and
Republicans are further apart and more antagonistic to each other than ever before even in the
realm of foreign policy, unlike earlier eras when ”politics stopped at the water’s edge”, as said
Senator Arthur Vandenberg, meaning that partisan tensions had no place in foreign policy (United
States Senate, 2019). Polarization and the nationalization of politics have created a unique political
environment that has not existed prior in modern American political history, as partisan divides
today are not due to an issue, but based on cultural differences that lead to entirely divergent
worldviews. Candidates, and the parties more generally, rarely attempt to reach out to the other
side of the aisle, removing the impetus for compromise or centrist policies. Polarization has made the
two dominant political parties race towards opposite ends of the ideological spectrum, attempting
to boost turnout of their own core base. As a result, split down-ballot voting has experienced
significant decline, further increasing the political divide between Republicans and Democrats.
These trends of polarization (largely fueled by inequality) and nationalization of politics has
coincided with another, longer-lasting trend in the federal government: the increasing power of the
executive branch over foreign policy. Following the end of World War II, Congress delegated much
of its constitutional control over foreign policy to the executive branch. Efforts to limit executive
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control over foreign policy have periodically gained steam in recent eras, but such efforts have been
limited in the Trump era, mostly to tariffs.
These two trends - increasing polarization and executive control over foregin policy - have
created what essentially amounts to several foreign policies for America, depending on which party
controls the executive branch. These two foreign policies - what I call Republican Party foreign
policy and Democratic Party foreign policy - have very different priorits. Foreign policy is now used
to accomplish domestic partisan goals at home, and the different goals of each party’s respective
base is the main motivator for each party’s foreign policy track. These divergent foreign policies
have had strong impacts on America’s relations with different types of countries based on the
regime type of those countries, and also harm the credibility of America’s long-term international
agreements when the executive branch changes party hands.
All political parties have different goals when in power. However, what makes the current
political situation regarding foreign policy unique is the sheer distance between Democratic and
Republican priorities. These different priorities can be summarized as a greater emphasis on se-
curity and combating terrorism for the Republican party at the cost of promoting human rights
and democratization, which have remained priorities for the Democrats along with the integrity of
multinational institutions; Pew Research Reports that only 11 per cent of Republicans say democ-
racy promotion should be a top foreign policy priority, and 20 per cent for promoting and defending
human rights in other countries (Pew Research Center, 2018a). Evidence supports that regimes
on the right-hand half of the political spectrum (the shades closer to authoritarianism) approve of
Republican presidents and Republican Party foreign policy. American diplomatic ties with those
countries generally improve under Republican administrations regardless of a regime’s undermining
of democracy or recent human rights violations. Likewise, regimes on the left hand of the political
spectrum (the shades closer to liberal democracy) approve of Democratic presidents and the Demo-
cratic Party foreign policy . Ties between America and these countries improve under Democratic
administrations.
The September 11th terrorist attacks pushed this phenomenon of polarized foreign policy to
the fore after gestating for years. And while the Middle East is the region that receives the bulk
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Figure 1: The Political Spectrum With Case Studies
of American foreign policy attention post-September 11th, this paper chooses to instead focus on
Southeast Asia. There are a variety of reasons for this decision.
First, the political diversity found in the Southeast Asia is greater than almost anywhere else
on the planet. For the sake of this paper, Southeast Asia is defined as the region north of Australia,
south of China, East of India, and west of the Philippines, including that country. The region
boasts of countries with every form of government from flourishing liberal democracies to religiously
dominated kingdoms and communist states. This diversity makes Southeast Asia the ideal testing
ground for examine how regime type affects relations with America. Further, the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) prefers not to promote any one specific ideology or system
of governance due to the diversity of its member nations, instead viewing itself as primarily an
economic and geopolitical multilateral institution.
Secondly, Southeast Asia was largely marginalized in modern American foreign policy prior to
September 11th; only after it became an arena for Bush’s War on Terror, and also as a staging
ground for pushing back against China’s geopolitical and economic clout did it become relevant.
Unlike the Middle East, where tensions against the United States have been inflamed in recent
decades (due to tensions with Iran since the revolution in 1978, the first Gulf War in 1990, support
of Israel and so on), outside of the Vietnam War which ended over twenty-five years ago, the
United States has largely ignored Southeast Asia. This lack of attention and interferance resulted
in a ‘clean slate’ for the imposition of polarized U.S. foreign policy following September 11th, as
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there had been minimal U.S. interaction in the decade beforehand.
Lastly, Southeast Asia is among the most important future geopolitical regions for the interests
of the United States going into the 21st century. The ideological battle brewing between China’s
controlled, government-led society and America’s brand of liberal democracy and capitalism will be
fought there much as the fight between communism exported from the Soviet Union and American
democracy came to loggerheads in Europe in the years following World War II. Economic growth
in the region is robust and increasing, riding a global trade boom. Southeast Asia has a population
of 593 million, a figure that has increased 48 per cent since 1985 (Jones, 2013: p.3). China has been
aggressively expanding its presence in the region (look no further than the reacquisition of Hong
Kong and Macau in the 1990’s, and infrastruture and loan programs today), and the U.S., until
recently, was attempting to do the same via the Trans-Pacific Partnership and a number of other
initiatives. The region has a robust economy and an increasing population and will increase in global
importance. Yet, unlike Europe in aftermath of World War II with its widely shared consensus
for democratic governance, there are no political norms in Southeast Asia across all countries. It
is vitally important for the U.S. to understand how to navigate the myriad of different types of
governments based on ideological differences and agreements, and to know how America’s domestic
political situation affects those relations, in order for the U.S. to succeed in regional competition
with China.
This paper focuses on American ties with Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines
since September 11th. These countries were selected due to each occupying a different space on
the ideological spectrum. Indonesia has been and looks to continue into the future as a liberal
democracy; Vietnam is a authoritarian, communist society; the Kingdom of Thailand has a king, a
parliamentary democracy and numerous political coups in the past few decades, and the Philippines
has been a relative democratic success story until recently with the ascent and reign of President
Rodrigo Duterte. This paper examines U.S. ties to these nations since September 11th, looking
at how relations have changed with Republican versus Democratic foreign policy with the goal of
establishing a generally-applicable system for predicting U.S. relations to a country given its regime
structure and the party of the occupant of the Oval Office.
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In the following pages, this paper will first critically examine existing literature on American
polarization, inequality, relations to the countries in question, and explore what gaps in knowledge
or theory it hopes to be able to fill. After summarizing the existing literature, the theory of the
paper as well as the research design and methodology will be summarized. The four separate case
studies will be examined in detail, along with summaries of the findings and both recommendations
for further research and other issue areas in which these findings may be applicable.
Literature Review and Theory
To understand how American foreign policy became subject to partisan tensions, several political
trends beginning many years ago need to be closely examined. That American politics in recent
years have become incredibly gridlocked is not news to anyone - Abramowitz and Webster call
increasing polarization in the American electorate “one of the most important trends in American
politics over the past several decades”, pointing out how all politics are are now nationalized. This
trend has been coupled with an increasing in oppositional feelings to the other party (Abramowitz
and Webster, 2016: p.12). In recent years, this polarization has spilled over into foreign policy,
affecting the perception and reliability of the U.S. everywhere in the international arena, but perhaps
nowhere more significantly than Southeast Asia. But what are the primary drivers of American
political polarization?
Building off of research done by Abramowitz, I conducted my own research further into po-
larization. The chart below uses data from the American National Elections Survey. Voters were
asked to give their political orientation on a seven-point scale, from extreme liberal to extreme
conservative. y2 was coded as a variable representing the number of individuals self-identifying as
extreme liberal or extreme conservative as a portion of the entire electorate in that given election.1
This chart adds to the increasingly substantial evidence showing an increase in polarization
among the American electorate. Although only two per cent of voters in 1986 self-identified with
‘extreme liberal’ or ‘extreme’ conservative, that per centage had climbed to twelve per cent by
2012. Figure 2 also contains no data on voters who self identified as ‘2’ or ‘6’ on the scale, which
correlates to ‘strong liberal’ or ‘strong conservative’, which could reasonably be assumed to have
1American National Election Studies Time Series Cumulative Data File 1948-2016 (2018)
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Figure 2: Increasing American Polarization
similar growth as extreme liberals and conservatives.
55 per cent of Americans identify as Democrat or Republican (Party Affiliation, 2019). If half
of each party self-identifies as extreme, that affects both which and how candidates run in elections,
skewing the platforms and policy towards the wishes of the highly-motivated and highly-polarized
voters at the cost of moderates. Compared to 2002, 2012 had an electorate that was more than
100 per cent as polarized.
More importantly for the sake of this paper, the above chart shows a remarkable quickening in
political polarization since the September 11th terrorist attacks. This is consistent with what other
scholars have shown, but important for the argument of this paper as only unpresidented levels
of political polarization could make possible the phenomenon of polarized foreign policy occurring
today.
Very little time passed after the terrorist attacks before there was an extreme increase in either
loyalty to the Bush and his War on Terror, or for those who disagreed with the war or its methods
to quickly coalesce into the opposition. Afghanistan would quickly become a divisive partisan issue,
a perception that would spill over into many of the administrations other actions, both domestically
and abroad (Beinart, Hirsh, and Rodman, 2007: p.15). Emboldened, Democrats moved to oppose
these actions wherever possible.
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The September 11th terrorist attacks poured fuel on the embers of partisan foreign policy. The
conflict over the correct responses to the terrorist attacks in the following year accelerated and
worsened the phenomenon of partisan foreign policy (Beinart, Hirsh, and Rodman, 2007: p.16).
A brief mention as to what other external causes led to increased polarization in the American
polity here is necessary. As is well documented, income inequality has been increasing in the
United States since the eighties; the Bush tax cuts and 2008 financial crisis only exacerbated this
trend. Using the American National Elections Survey and data from the U.S. Census Bureau,
inequality - represented by the U.S.’s yearly gini index score, has a much greater impact on a given
American’s likelihood to self-identify as an extreme liberal or conservative than religion, region, or
education.2 These findings are largely in line with Richard Posner’s findings (Posner, 1997). He
writes “Among the wealthy nations of the world, the United States and Switzerland appear to have
the most unequal income distributions. . . income level, a society’s average or median income, does
affect political stability. . . Being badly off, the people are likely to feel (though often wrongly) that
they have nothing to lose from a change in the system of government” (Posner, 1997: p.349).
Foreign policy has long been perceived to be separate from the gridlock that is the new norm in
domestic American politics, but this is no longer the case (Lieberman, 2018). For long periods of
American history, this trend has been true. James McCormick and Eugene Wittkopf (1990) indicate
that between 1945 and 1964, “congressional voting behavior. . . strongly supported the proposition
that a consensus [in foreign policy] did indeed exist”.3 However, the belief in the independence of
foreign policy from domestic political polarization has changed in recent years, with McCormick
and Wittkopf writing in their piece Bipartisanship, Partisanship, and Ideology in Congressional-
Executive Foreign Policy Relations, 1947-1988, that “studies. . . consistently demonstrate that ide-
ology is a potent factor in explaining foreign-policy voting in Congress and that significant issues
along partisan lines also exist”.4 Jeffrey Peake (2002) furthers the analysis of polarization in the
arena of foreign policy, stating “. . . as partisanship in Congress has increased, opposition parties
2According to these regressions, a single point increase in the gini coefficient for the U.S. makes a given individual
208 per cent more likely to self-identify as either an extreme liberal or conservative, compared to less than a high
school education (1.7 per cent), if they were protestant (4.9 per cent), or a host of other factors.
3(McCormick and Wittkopf, 1990: p.1079)
4Ibid, 1080
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in Congress have forwarded their own foreign policy agendas”, before summarizing that “gridlock
caused by party differences carries over into foreign policy”(Peake, 2002: p.70). These findings
strongly support the theory that a Pan-American non-partisan foreign policy used to exist, but
does no longer. What was once considered too important and delicate to be subjected to partisan
tensions is now primarily done by partisans hoping to advance their foreign policy priorities at the
expense of the opposition, and as a method to rile up their own supporters - a far cry from Senator
Vandenberg’s idealistic statement in 1947 (Lieberman, 2018).
But, according to the literature, what is political polarization, who controls polarized foreign
policy, and why does it matter? Esteban and Schneider (2008) define polarization as “the extent
to which the population is clustered around a small number of distinct poles”, before going on to
note that polarization is maximized when the distribution of a population is bimodal around two
poles (Esteban and Schneider, 2008: p.133). Ominously, they go on to note that “The process of
increasing social and political polarizarion seem to go hand in hand with economic polarization”
(p.132). This is the definition of polarization used throughout the rest of this paper.
The constitution formally delegates most aspects of foreign policy to Congress, and specifi-
cally, the Senate. However, in the post-World War II aftermath, Congress began delegating more
and more of its foreign policy decision-making to the executive branch. Robert Dallek expands
on this topic, writing “. . . the President’s control over foreign affairs has been growing since the
Theodore Roosevelt administration (and still grows today)”, before surmising that “by the early
1960s, the president had become the undisputed architect of U.S. foreign policy” (Dallek, 2011).
The Council on Foreign Relations concurs, writing that ”Congress has passed legislation giving
the executive additional authority to act on...foreign policy issues” (Council on Foreign Relations,
2017). Kenneth Schultz (2017) shows how this growing control over foreign policy has become
institutionalized beyond the purviews of Congress, writing “As with the use of force, presidents
have unilateral powers that allow them to make international agreements without Congressional
approval. Executive agreements serve many of the same functions as treaties, but do not require
ratification [from Congress]. The use of executive agreements has exploded since World War II, and
around 94 per cent of international agreements take this form” (Schultz, 2017: p.15). So complete
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has executive branch control over foreign policy grown that nothing but overwhelming congres-
sional support against proposed foreign policy actions can limit a president’s foreign policy aims,
as Schultz continues to write, “. . . inability to get bipartisan support does not necessarily prevent
a policy from being enacted since the president has considerable unilateral powers deriving from
his position as commander-in-chief”, such as Bush’s unilateral decision to issue a national security
waiver over objections from Congress to resume arms sales and training exercises to Indonesia in
2005.5
The transition away from congressionally-led foreign policy to policy being directed by the presi-
dent has occurred during the same time as polarization increased in American politics. Polarization
has had created a dynamic in both local and national elections where the amount of supporters from
one party supporting a candidate from the opposing party has significantly dwindled (Abramowitz
and Webster, 2016: p.12). This change has the effect of there being little to no incentive for candi-
dates to try and woo voters from the other party. Instead, they attempt to play to the extremes of
their own party in order to shore up support. Abramowitz and Webster describe this phenomenon
by saying “Recent elections in the United States have been characterized by the highest levels of
party loyalty and straight-ticket voting since the American National Election Studies first began
measuring party identification in 1952” (p.12). They summarize by indicating,
Representation today means almost exclusively partisan representation. There is little
or no incentive for most members of the House or Senate to consider the views of
supporters of the opposing party because it has become very difficult to persuade these
voters to cross party lines and because few members need the votes of opposing partisans
in order to secure reelection. For the most part, Republican members are only interested
in the views of Republican voters and Democratic members are only interested in the
views of Democratic voters (Abramowitz and Webster, 2016: p.21).
The presidency was designed to represent all Americans, yet increasingly in the political envi-
ronment since September 11th, presidents have been responsive only to their own party interests
knowing that obtaining support from the opposite side of the aisle is borderline impossible. Brett
5Ibid, p.13.
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Leeds writes that with regards to agreements, treaties, and alliances with other agreements with
foreign powers, “. . . states that feature higher degrees of accountability to domestic groups (democ-
racies) face high costs for breaking promises” (Leeds, 1999: p.989). So for the presidency in this
modern context, there is no cost to abandoning outreach efforts to the other party since no members
of that opposing party will support the current administration anyway; presidential foreign policy
decisions are now largely made with interest towards appeasing one’s base without a thought to
the opposition.
Erik Gartzke and Kristian Gleditsch touched upon this exact phenomenon when they write,
“. . . governments that are answerable to popular preferences face a dilemma when confronted by
popular alliance commitments. Attending to domestic demands will occasionally anger strategic
partners, while contradicting the wishes of citizens is only ever easy when the public has little say”
(Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004: p.776). If the foreign policy decision-maker is answerable only to
their own party, and their party’s priorities in foreign policy are different or contradictory to those
of the party that preceded it, having only pressure to appease one’s own base often means taking
actions directly contradictory to policies pursued by their predecessor. However, there is a key
difference from the situation Gartzke and Gleditsch are writing about and the reality in the United
States today: the government of the United States is no longer answerable to the entirety of the
citizenry; only to the ruling party’s base. This further hurts America’s further political standing as
deals made by one administration that run contrary to the wishes of the opposition may be scrapped
immediately upon ascension of the opposition to power (i.e., the Trans-Pacific Partnership or the
Iran deal). Doing business with a partner whose commitment to upholding a deal only lasts as
long as the current congress or presidential term is not a recipe for long-term faith and stability
internationally.
Kenneth A. Schultz expands on the deleterious effects of a polarized foreign policy, writing:
Polarization has also decreased presidents’ willingness to appoint members of the other
party to the foreign policy bureaucracy, a strategy for building bridges to the opposition
and co-opting potential critics. At the same time, increasing distrust makes members of
the opposition party less willing to share any “ownership” of the president’s initiatives.
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In a period when there was greater agreement over the ends and means of foreign
policy, there was considerable deference to the executive on matters of national security;
deference is harder to find these days, replaced instead with an instinct to attack.
Partisan warfare also incentivizes the opposition to deny the president any victories
(Schultz, 2017: p.11).
Not only do these studies of political polarization in foreign policy sugget that we are developing
a presidency that makes decisions ignoring of the wishes of the opposition, but the current dynamics
of the system also incentivizes the opposition to attack any action taken by the presidency that
could reasonably be deemed a ‘victory’, regardless of whether or not the action taken was actually
beneficial to the nation as a whole. Schultz summarizes the overall, final impact of polarization in
foreign policy by plainly stating, “The risk of dramatic policy swings from one administration to
another of the opposite party complicates our ability to make long-term commitments to allies and
adversaries” (Schultz, 2017: p.9).
But the changes wrought by polarization to American foreign policy don’t end there: the very
institutional mechanisms built into the core functioning of the government have been undermined
and weakened by this debilitating political force. For much of America’s history, domestic insti-
tutions actually helped the credibility of our international agreements, or as Peter Cowhey wrote
in 1993, “. . . certain U.S. political institutions (namely, the division of power between the legisla-
tive and executive branches) enhanced the credibility of its multilayer commitments after 1945”
(Cowhey, 1993: p.300). However, due to polarization, the legislative branch has largely surren-
dered its oversight and limiting role over the executive branch, especially when the entirety of the
federal government is controlled by one party; even when the legislative and executive branches
are held by different parties, knee-jerk attack instincts from each side prevent any compromise
or lasting agreement simply due to partisan disagreements. As Fleisher et al. writes, “Congress
jealously guards its foreign policy prerogatives and majority party leaders are less likely to defer
to a minority president. Studies that show. . . an increase in partisanship in foreign policy indi-
rectly suggest that gridlock caused by party differences carries over into foreign policy” (Peake,
2002: p.70). Rather acutely, Brett Leeds hits the nail on the head when he surmises that parties
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tend to back collective goods in foreign policy if those collective goods help their domestic political
reputation (Leeds, 1999). Now, unlike before, backing collective goods to bolster one’s political
reputation means exclusively appeasing one’s own base, rather than the country as a whole. This
is the very foundation that partisan foreign policy is based on: if all Republican voters want one
action, individuals attempting to govern the Republican coalition have no choice but to play to
that desire, even if it runs directly contradictory to what the Democratic half of the country wants.
This paper uses the terrorist attacks of September 11th as a starting point for its examinations
of American foreign policy in Southeast Asia because September 11th was the primary shaping
event in forming each party’s foreign policy for the 21st century and for the large variations in
polarization levels domestically since the attacks. As Peter Beinart said in a Brookings Institute
panel in 2007, “Just to say, it [bipartisan foreign policy consensus] takes a long time through World
War I and the Cold War for this bipartisan consensus to crack. It cracks very, very quickly. The
War on Terror consensus cracks very, very quickly. I think it - there’s a consensus for about a year,
from the fall of 2001 until the fall of 2002” (Beinart, Hirsh, and Rodman, 2007: p.15). Kenneth
Schultz goes a step further and says, “In the 2000’s, the unity created in the wake of the September
11th terrorist attacks quickly gave way to stark partisan division over the Iraq War, as President
George W. Bush backed a more robust assertion of U.S. power, even in the absence of international
consensus” (Schultz, 2017: p.10-11).
The September 11th attacks spawned the War on Terror by the Bush Administration, and
the administration would frequently adopt a unilateral, preemtive strategy to deal with perceived
American threats. Countries and regions that were pariahs to the United States previously were
now welcomed into the fold regardless of their domestic political situations so long as they assisted
with the War on Terror. To this effect writes Hang Nguyen of the the second Bush administra-
tion, “The George W. Bush administration (2001-2008) initially paid little attention to Southeast
Asia. . . Southeast Asia garnered President Bush’s attention in the wake of the September 11th at-
tacks. The region was considered as a “second front” in the Bush administration’s global war on
terror” (Nguyen, 2016: p.41). U.S. modern-day involvement in Southeast Asia began largely with
the Bush administration’s globe-spanning war, with Simon saying as much when he writes ”In the
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decade after September 11th, Southeast Asia became a kind of second from after west Asia with
respect to radical Islamic violence” (Simon, 2017: p.48).
September 11th, combined with the growing trends of polarization and control over foreign
policy coming from the executive branch, created a perfect mix of events for Bush to launch his
war, a war that would be fought over American security concerns. Democrats, after initially
backing Bush’s efforts to combat terror following September 11th, would quickly deviate to form
their own foreign policy - to be enacted under Obama’s presidency - that placed greater emphasis
on multilateralism, democratization, and human rights as a strategy to combat the spread of terror
rather than relying on a security-centric strategy.
Understanding this phenomenon’s effect in Southeast Asia is particularly important. Not only
is the region quickly increasing in population and economic prowess, but it is to be the future battle
ground - like Europe in the early stages of the Cold War - between China and the United States
(Weatherbee, 2009: p.4-6). The political complexity of the region means there is no one-size-fits-all
strategy that will work to further American interests, like the Marshall Plan in Europe; American
foreign policy decision makers need to understand how to communicate with all different kinds of
regimes and understand their worries and goals in order to craft an effective policy to deepen U.S.
ties in the region and help the country achieve its objectives.
Fortunately, there is already significant and substantial literature that touches upon how regime
similarity and difference affects relationships between countries. Again in Domestic Political In-
stitutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation, Brett Leeds argues that “that
domestic political structure, and particularly dyadic similarity in domestic structure, does have
an impact on levels of cooperation and that both jointly democratic and jointly autocratic dyads
tend towards higher average levels of cooperation than do states with different domestic political
structures” (Leeds, 1999: p.981). This is, he suggests, because “The domestic accountability of
democratic leaders and the lack of policy-making flexibility characteristic of democratic states to
assure others of their future intentions. Thus, jointly democratic dyads find it easier to overcome
the problems associated with the lack of external enforcement of international agreements”. In
short, domestic politics and priorities matter. The United States, as a democracy, should and does
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internationally cooperate better with democracies than non-democracies for a variety of reasons,
among them being shared domestic pressures and understandings. However, President Obama is
noticeably more popular in democratic countries than both his predecessor and successor, with
Pew Research reporting, “During the Bush era, opposition to U.S. foreign policy and rising anti-
Americanism were widespread in many regions of the world, but Obama’s election in November
2008 led to a significant improvement in America’s global image” (Wike, Poushter, and Zainulbhai,
2016). Europe in particular, viewed Obama higher than his predecessor, as can be seen from their
global attitudes data sets available for download. Using their datasets, the charts below were con-
structed which shows the confidence rate foreign countries have in the given U.S. president to do
the ‘right thing’.6 These data were then compiled into the dataset, which was then charted out,
separating Obama’s approval in democratic and authoritarian countries (regrettably, there is only
limited data for the case study countries in this paper).
Obama significantly helped the U.S.’s global standing in the eyes of democratic countries (Wike,
Poushter, and Zainulbhai, 2016). This popularity is in largely due to Obama’s greater respect for
multinational institutions, priorities, and policies; it is also worth noting that Obama and his
Democratic Party foreign policy were further to the left and more similar to the liberal democracies
of Europe than the Republican parties of Bush or Trump. This trend continued to Southeast
Asia, where Obama continued his emphasis on multilateral diplomacy and institutions, with Sutter
writing in 2010, “The United States [under Obama and Sec. Clinton] joined ASEAN’s Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation in a step that improved U.S. relations with Southeast Asian countries
and offered possible U.S. participation in the Asian Leadership Summit conveyed by the ASEAN-
anchored East Asia Summit forum” (Sutter, 2010: 45). This trend of democratic foreign policy
being more popular amongst fellow democracies also continues to Southeast Asia; in Indonesia, 64
per cent of Indonesians viewed Obama favorably, compared to 23 per cent for Trump (Simon, 2017).
Obama’s support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a sweeping and revolutionary trade agreement
6Pew’s data is gathered by national samples via in-person interviews or telephone interviews. And while their
method for collecting data for their 2016 Global Attitudes Survey differed slightly by country, all countries with
effective phone systems used a Random Digit Dial probability sample and by talking to the youngest adult male
or female in the household. In countries without adequate phone systems, primary sampling units were utilized.
Interviews were done in native languages, and sample sizes for most countries numbered around the 1,000 mark.
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Figure 3: U.S. Approval in Democratic Countries
between many member nations also likely played a positive role in his standing in the region.
It is also worth noting that Obama’s popularity was significantly comparatively lower in more
authoritarian countries, such as China, Jordan, and increasingly-autocratic Turkey. Perhaps indic-
tively, “Vietnam is the only one of the three where positive views of the US have increased since
Trump took office”, with 71 per cent believing he is well qualified to be president (Simon, 2017:
p.45). Vietnam is, of course, still controlled absolutely by the Communist Party of Vietnam that
denies basic freedoms and human rights to its people, instead placing emphasis on stability and
security.
Unlike the well-established liberal democracies in western Europe that the United States counts
among its closest allies, Southeast Asia is more of a mixed bag. Countries span the entire spectrum
from totalitarian to democratic; correspondingly, different countries have different levels of freedom
and respect for human rights. The Trump administration’s return to the Bush unilateral, security-
based foreign policy has played well among the certain, generally more authoritarian, countries in
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Figure 4: U.S. Approval in Authoritarian Countries
Southeast Asia while others have been dismayed at these priority changes. Proof that the Trump
administration has less of an interest in human rights and democracy could hardly have been less
subtle; Simon writes in 2017 that, “Secretary Tillerson. . . told a gathering of State Department
employees that human rights concerns will be subordinated to US national security and economic
interests” (Simon, 2017: p.44). Further proving that Republican foreign policy is more centered
on unilateral actions to bring about peace and stability, Simon writes in the article Abandoning
Leadership, “The one domain in which the US remains engaged in Southeast Asia is defense co-
operation. Yet, even here, US actions are unilateral or bilateral, not multilateral with a couple of
exceptions such as the annual Cobra Gold military exercise and the biannual Rim of the Pacific
(RIMPAC) naval exercise” (Simon, 2018: p.43).
This lack of prioritization of human rights has benefited the United States’s relationship with
Vietnam. As Weatherbee writes, “The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is organized as a Marxist-
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Leninist one-party state that does not allow political opposition. Basic democratic liberties are
denied. No domestic or international human rights groups are permitted to operate” (Weatherbee,
2009: p.262). Given this domestic political setup and the rightward tack of the Trump administra-
tion’s foreign policy, it is unsurprising that the countries have become and will be becoming closer,
as now “Secretary of Defense Mattis, in discussions with Vietnamese counterpart Ngo Xuan Lich in
Washington on Aug. 8, promised a visit by a US aircraft carrier in 2018 and deeper defense coop-
eration” (Simon, 2017: p.47). Similarly unsurprising is that “President Trump is more popular in
Vietnam than he is in the United States. A 2017 Pew survey found that 58 per cent of Vietnamese
were confident in President Trump’s ability to guide US foreign policy, and 84 per cent had general
confidence in the United States” (Simon, 2018: p.49). Regimes and ideologies that have similar
goals or at least distinct motives that lead to the same goals - such as the Vietnamese government
and society and Republican Party foreign policy, which both prize security and stability - get along
more readily than Democratic Party foreign policy and those same authoritarian nations. Yet,
there is a more ominous development underneath this energized friendship: “. . . the human rights
issue was notably absent from Vietnam-US discussions during Trump’s visit except for one short
sentence in the joint statement: “The two leaders recognized the importance of protecting and
promoting human rights.” The U.S. House of Representatives, however, had urged the president to
raise “Vietnam’s dismal human rights record” during his talks. There is no evidence that he did so”
(Simon, 2018: p.49).
The U.S. - Indonesian relationship has at times been strained as the country struggled to consol-
idate its democracy after the fall of Suharto and his “New Order” in 1998; however, and predictably,
even as Indonesia struggled to deal with power-hungry and corrupt politicians, rebellions, human
rights and military atrocities, the Bush administration was more than happy to work with the
country to promote security:
In November 2005, the Bush administration exercised a national security waiver to
remove sanctions on the military relationship, resuming arms sales and training exercises
over strong opposition from human rights groups and many in Congress who argued
that Indonesia had failed to comply with the Leahy Amendment. Congress succeeded
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in retaining a ban on Kopassus, the Indonesian Special Forces most directly implicated
in military atrocities (Murphy, 2010: p.374).
The election of Obama served to help rehabilitate the image of America in the eyes of Indone-
sians; according to the Pew Research Center, the per centage of Indonesian’s who viewed America in
a positive light increased from 37 per cent before the election (during the end of Bush’s presidency)
to 63 per cent afterwards. This is in part due to a foreign policy that better prioritized Indonesia’s
formulating democracy and human values, and an administration that valued Indonesia for more
than its ability to be a partner in the global war against terror, or as Ann Murphy put it, “Under
the Obama administration policy towards Indonesia has been driven. . . by shared democratic val-
ues and interests” (Murphy, 2010: p.362). In light of the flourishing relationship, in the National
Security Strategy for 2010, the Obama administration described Indonesia thusly: “Indonesia - as
the world’s fourth most populous country, a member of the G-20, and a democracy - will become
an increasingly important partner on regional and transnational issues. . . With tolerance, resilience,
and multiculturalism as core values, and a flourishing civil society, Indonesia is uniquely positioned
to help address challenges facing the developing world” (National Security Strategy, 2010: p.380).
It again bears notice that when Obama passed power to Donald Trump and over the course of the
following year, the favorability ranking of the United States in Indonesia declined from 62 per cent
in 2015 to 48 per cent in 2017, and that Trump’s own favorability ranking is only 23 per cent (Si-
mon, 2017: p.45). Of course, Trump’s past statements and actions in office towards Muslims have
also had their toll on his standing in that country, but President Bush’s similar lack of popularity
- while not saying anything derogatory towards Islam - indicates that it is Indonesian disapproval
of Republican foreign policy, not Trump’s statements, that is responsible for his lack of popularity
in Indonesia.
The United States and Thailand share a long and convoluted history that can be described
as ‘two steps forward, one step back’ or, as Paul Chambers states, ”common interest have led to
warmer ties [between Thailand and the United States] while certain strains remain” (Chambers,
2004: p.460). This pattern has continued into the 21st century where Thai-U.S. relations were
frequently challenged or put on hold due to military coups. In addition, the U.S. limited the
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cultivation of a friendly relationship due to Thailand’s questionable record on human rights , or
as Simon writes, “Thai-US relations have been strained since the May 2014 coup that deposed a
democratically elected government and brought the military to power again. . . US officials during
the Obama years criticized Thailand for human rights shortcomings and the absence of democratic
processes” (Simon, 2017: p.49). Ties only began to resume when “The Thai premier also confirmed
Thailand had a road map for the return of democratic rule” (Simon, 2017: p.49-50).
However, with the election of Donald Trump and the implementation of the Republican Party
security-centric foreign policy, pressure for Thailand to democratize in order to improve ties was
lifted, or as Simon writes, “Thailand and the US restored military relations with the Trump admin-
istration abandoning Obama’s pressure to restore democratic processes” (Simon, 2018: p.48). This
change began when President Trump invited Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha to the White
House; Prayut is a retired officer in the military and is the head of the National Council for Peace
and Order; perhaps more tellingly, is no friend of democracy and has delayed the elections meant
to restore Thailand to a democracy. Even more telling was that, when the meeting did occur, “The
Trump administration did not complain about the Thai military junta’s suppression of free speech,
banned political activities, or imprisoned dissidents” (Simon, 2018: p.48).
The case of U.S-Philippine relations is perhaps the most telling of this trend where Republican
Party foreign policy justifies the rollback of democracy and human rights in the name of security
and ’law and order’; the U.S. has elected a president to whom security and stability are his ultimate
priorities. Rodrigo Duterte shares these priorities, as evidenced by his policies towards percieved
drug abusers.
Filipino democracy, until Duterte, had been a moderate success story of democracy in the
region. Its governmental structure has been historically influenced by and structured by the United
States’, owing to its past colonial experience, even having a very similar role for the President in
the constitution. And after success at increasing and consolidating democratic advances in recent
years in the Philippines, the election of Rodrigo Duterte came as a shock. A greater shock was
perhaps the speed with which he undermined the rule of law in the Philippines to establish a brutal
war on drugs, killing thousands of his own citizens in extrajudicial assassinations. As Duterte’s
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war in his own country continued, relations between the United States and the Philippines soured
to the point of Duterte calling Obama both a “son of a bitch’ and a “son of a whore” when Obama
criticized Duterte’s human rights violations and killings of his own people. But the election of
Trump, ironically, made for better relations between the two countries, or as Simon contends,
President Duterte clashed with President Obama over the human rights violations that
have been a central feature of the Philippine president’s anti-drug campaign. Some
8,000 extrajudicial killings of alleged drug traffickers have occurred since Duterte took
office in 2016. Yet, bilateral relations have improved under Trump, who has ignored
Duterte’s egregious human rights practices, while praising his anti-drug policy (Simon,
2018: p.45).
Under Trump, U.S. - Filipino ties have improved to the point where military exercises between
the two countries have resumed (cancelled by Duterte after a particularly vibrant speech respond-
ing to Obama’s criticisms of his drug war), new defense agreements are being implemented (the
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement), and President Trump even went as far as inviting
Duterte to the White House (Simon, 2017). The Republican Party foreign policy so values security
and anti-terrorism operations that the party standard bearer is willing to invite a leader who has
killed over eight thousand of his own people to the White House.
These two trends, increasing homogeneity of voters within the parties coupled with increasing
power in constructing and advancing foreign policy from the executive branch, have combined in
recent years to create partisan foreign policy. If only one process had occurred in the absence of the
other - increasing political homogeneity sans the increasing power of the executive, or vice-versa
- this modern phenomenon of polarization foreign policy, or foreign policy being driven primarily
by partisan domestic political concerns, could not have occurred. While these trends have been
studied separately, focused scholarship on the effects of both trends together is lacking and almost
non-existent. This confluence of long-lasting trends in American politics is one of the holes in
existing knowledge this paper seeks to address.
Scholars have largely failed to explore or understand how this dynamic has affected the United
State’s foreign policy goals systematically around the world. It is this gap in the knowledge that this
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paper attempts to fill by focusing on discovering a systematic link of shared interests between both
dominant parties in the American political system and different types of regimes on the political
spectrum. Through examining U.S. ties with Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines,
this paper will explore how relations have changed during both flunctuations in polarization in the
U.S. domestically, but also with these countries - all of different regime types - throughout their
own political evolutions as some have moved from liberal to authoritarian or the opposite, or even
both.
Research Design and Methodology
With these two interconnected and foundational theories - variation and increasing polarization
domestically and growing power in the executive branch over foreign policy - now established, the
next stage of this paper will first devote itself towards creating a methodology that closely analyses
the relationships between the aforementioned countries - Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and the
Philippines - for evidence of polarized foreign policy interacting with different regime structures,
ranging from the very liberal to the very authoritarian. First, the paper will briefly summarize the
causal reasons why the relationship between the U.S. and a country improves or worsen, before
presenting a table displaying Polity’s dataset tracking the case country’s position ideological place
on the spectrum through time and in comparison to each other. After, the paper presents another
table displaying the predicted relationship changes between the U.S. and the case study nations if
the causal systems and incentives this paper hypothesizes drive foreign policy today are accurate.
This section also includes the evidence I search for and would expect to find if the causal story
between polarized foreign policy and the U.S.’s relationships to the case study nations is accurate.
Today’s Republican Party foreign policy views American security as the primary priority of
American foreign policy, in contrast to the Democratic Party foreign policy priorities of human
rights promotion and democratization. We see the Republican Party foreign policy being enacted
today in a number of ways: aggressive steps to curb North Korea, a more belligerent pose towards
Iran, and even Trump praising the Philippine’s increasingly-autocratic Rodrigo Duterte for his
extra-judicial killings of thousands. Due to shared interests and priorities, one would expect to see
relatively closer ties between governments with autocratic governments and leaders and Republican
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presidents than when compared to a Democratic administration.
Likewise, a lack of concern or interest in human rights violations would be expected between
a Republican president and an autocratic country; pressure to democratize would decrease, and
political ties would warm as opposed to with Democratic Party foreign policy. If the autocracy is
genuinely supported by the people, and the regime allows polling, favorability rankings of the United
States are used as evidence and expected to rise during a Republican administration compared to
a Democratic administration. If the regime does not allow polling, state media would be expected
to give relatively better statements regarding the U.S., and this is used as evidence. The leaders of
the countries, or appropriate ministers and generals, might even go out of their way to praise the
other; speeches and official statements are also used as evidence of strengthening or weaken ties
between the U.S. and the case study nation.
However, while relations to liberal democracies may suffer under Republican Party foreign
policy, they would be expected to improve with Democratic Party foreign policy. This is due to
Democratic Party foreign policy’s and liberal regimes’ shared emphasis on democratization, human
rights, to the utilization of other strategies besides pursuing greater security to ensure a peaceful
world. One would expect to see more work and communication via multilateral institutions. One
would also expect to see increased support for the United States via polling in liberal democracies
when a Democrat is president of the U.S. due to these aligned interests. All of this is used as
evidence in the rest of the paper. In liberal democracies, in theory the electorate holds the power
and can place those that mirror their views into positions of power in the government. If the
electorate of a given country is supportive of democracy, human rights, and multilateralism, then
not only would a relative increase in support for the US with a Democratic president relative to a
republican president be expected, but the citizenry of those countries would be expected to elect
leaders whose goals and views aligned with the U.S. interests. Again, this is relative compared to
with a Republican president. The hypothesized general relationship this paper expects to find are
below:
In democratic countries, a leader’s preferences are largely shaped by the voters that put the
leader in office. If the leader wishes to win reelection, their policies and decision must be at least
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Figure 5: Predicted Relationship Changes
somewhat representative of the wishes of the electorate at large. This is why leaders in democratic
countries tend to support human rights and democratization - a leader in Britain or Indonesia who
outwardly supported the jailing of ethnic minorities and journalists would likely loose their next
election. However, in autocratic countries, this relationship doesn’t exist as the ruler derives power
from sources other than the people - either claiming a divine mandate, in some cases popularity
with the people, or sometimes just sheer control of the state security apparatus. Due to this
disconnect between the wishes of the leader and the people in autocratic countries, for this paper,
relationships between the United States and the autocratic countries being examined - Vietnam
and occasionally Thailand - will be judged on the basis of either the leader’s’ or the ruling elites’s
relationship with the United States. In addition to the rulers holding political power, in Thailand
and Vietnam it often proved impossible to get large-scale data on the attitudes of the citizenry
on human rights and democratization due to repression and limitations on polling and expression,
both on the questioners and the respondents.
To establish a common basis for judging just how authoritarian or liberal a state is, this used
Polity’s IV Annual Time-Series Dataset as a baseline. This dataset codes democratic and autocratic
“patterns of authority” for all world countries with more than 500,000 citizens. Figure 6 tracks the
case study nation’s location on the ideological spectrum from 2000 to 2017, allowing for comparisons
between different nations and times. Figure 7 shows the expected changes to the U.S. relationship
with the case study countries, taking into account the levels of American political polarization at
that time, and the ideological bent of the case study nation. In Figure 6, higher scores coincide
with increased levels of democratization and freedom, while negative scores align with the opposite.
On the second table, an entry that says “Relative Improvement” or “Relatively Worse” generally
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means the White House switched party hands in the United States, or the case study country has
undergone some dramatic change. For example, Indonesia, a democracy, did not change its level
of democracy during the end of Bush’s presidency and the beginning of Obama’s, yet relations
between the United States and Indonesia would be hypothesized to improve when Obama assumed
power due to him being a Democrat, whereas Bush was a Republican.
Figure 6: Country Polity Scores, 2000-2017
A relationship between two countries is amicable and cooperative if there is significant progress
made on the shared priorities of those countries. If the U.S. and Thailand take successful steps
towards improving economic ties and military sales and have successful state meetings then they
had prior, I counted the relationship as productive and cooperative. In contrast, if the U.S. chal-
lenges Thailand’s government due to recent actions on human rights violations as the results of a
coup, this relationship is not cooperative as no progress is being made towards shared priorities:
rather, Thailand’s priority in the above scenario is security and stability, whereas the U.S.’s at this
hypothetical point in time is human rights and democratization. During these case studies, this
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Figure 7: How Ties Are Predicted to Fare
paper look for evidence of shared priorities and progress towards priorities to decide if the U.S.’s
priorities are shared or not with the case study country.
Before this paper begins examining individual case studies, the changes in American foreign
policy priorities by different years should be summarized; how the U.S.’s relationship with a case
study nation changes can then be attributed, at least half causally, because of U.S. foreign policy
priority changes. With the U.S. side of the equation summarized, the case studies can focus
themselves on how the interplay of a case study’s individual foreign policy priorities - stemming
from that country’s regimes’ place on the ideological spectrum - interplayed with the American
priorities.
The second Bush administration took a no-holds-barred approach towards combatting terror
around the world. The administration was willing to work with less-than-savory characters that
prior had been anathema to America in order to combat terror; Paul Chambers shines light on
this intentional blindness by pointing out how after September 11th, 2001, “Secretary of State
Colin Powell announced that Washington would now judge countries by their willingness to help”
(Chambers, 2004: p.465). Countries’ stances on human rights, democratization, and freedom of
the press were no longer priorities to the administration; these core ideals were replaced with a new
foreign policy priority: security, and at whatever cost necessary.
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Many countries previously not in the good graces of the United States would take advantage of
situation to improve their relations with the U.S. by both helping the U.S. crack down on terrorism
abroad, but also used terrorism as an excuse for silencing dissent domestically at home, oftentimes
as a tool of repression. Many countries with less-than-stellar histories on human rights would
become key U.S. allies in the War on Terror, and the U.S. would look the other way when those
same countries committed their own human rights abuses or used the War on Terror as an excuse
for domestic political repression.
Obama would reverse this trend as much as possible when he assumed office, instituting Demo-
cratic Party foreign policy for the first and only time since September 11th. The National Security
Strategy from 2010 made that clear when it stated
The United States supports the expansion of democracy and human rights abroad be-
cause governments that respect these values are more just, peaceful, and legitimate. We
also do so because their success abroad fosters an environment that supports America’s
national interests. Political systems that protect universal rights are ultimately more
stable, successful, and secure. As our history shows, the United States can more ef-
fectively forge consensus to tackle shared challenges when working with governments
that reflect the will and respect the rights of their people, rather than just the narrow
interests of those in power (National Security Strategy, 2010: p.37).
American priorities would change upon the Trump administration’s inauguration. These priori-
ties would revert back to a security-centric approach, abandoning the priorities of human rights and
democratization in favor of the no-hands-barred approach towards security. Countries the Obama
administration had shied away from doing business with were invited back in the fold; any ideolog-
ical hold-ups America may have had from doing business with authoritarian regimes quickly was
replaced with a desire to ensure America’s safety, both domestically and around the globe. This
new philosophy is, again, perfectly encapsulated with Secretary Tillerson’s statements that “human
rights concerns will be subordinated to US national security and economic interests” (Simon, 2017:
p.44).
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I. Case Study: Indonesia
In the wake of Suharto’s fall, Indonesia bore all the hallmarks of becoming a failed state. In 1998,
after President Suharto’s resignation, the economy collapsed by 13.8 per cent, and multiple ethnic
groups would engage in bloody standoffs with both other groups and state security forces (Murphy,
2010: p.362-363). Many in the United States were worried about the future of Indonesia, yet these
worries turned out to be unfounded: as Ann Murphy writes, “. . . Indonesia overcame its challenges.
Post-New Order governments restored macroeconomic stability. . . sectarian violence has declined
dramatically; and Indonesia has adopted a strong counter-terrorism policy. Indonesia embarked on
a messy but ultimately successful transition to democracy” (Murphy, 2010: p.362).
This unexpected flourishing, both economically, civically, and democratically, laid the ground-
work for a similarly healthy relationship with the United States. This was reflected in the 2002
National Security Strategy, where it is written that,
Indonesia took courageous steps to create a working democracy and respect for the rule
of law. By tolerating ethnic minorities, respecting the rule law, and accepting open
markets, Indonesia may be able to employ the engine of opportunity that has helped
lift some of its neighbors out of poverty and desperation. It is the initiative by Indonesia
that allows U.S. assistance to make a difference (The White House, 2002: p.10).
This happy beginning to the relationship, before the contrast between Republican foreign policy
and Democratic foreign reached its zenith and before polarization had yet to make its impact felt
to the extreme it would in later years, would be born out in more than just words in the National
Security Plan. An interesting dynamic appeared between the United States and Indonesia (and
the region more broadly) in the immediate aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks. Satu
Limaye refers to this dynamic in “Minding the Gaps”:
First, early Bush administration approaches to foreign and security policy were adjusted
as reflected in the new National Security Strategy. Second, the U.S. war on terrorism
cast a new importance to terrorism in Southeast Asia. Third, Southeast Asian countries,
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confronted with terrorism, and desirous of maximizing opportunities from constructive
relations with the U.S., sought to buttress ties with Washington (Limaye, 2004: p.73).
Cast in this view, the relative popularity of both the United States and President Bush per-
sonally makes sense and is consistent with the hypothesis of this paper. Prior to the rise of the
United States’s debilitating partisanship, and thus the true divergence of Republican foreign policy
priorities and Democratic foreign policy priorities, the goals of the two parties were closer together.
Indonesia, as a democracy, could support the early foreign policy consensus of President Bush, a
Republican, as long as the consensus on Bush’s foreign policy strategy last between the parties, of
which there is evidence it did so for a little bit more than a year (Beinart, Hirsh, and Rodman,
2007: p.15).
Indonesia had a strong working relationship with the United States initially. As the divide
between the President’s foreign policy and that of the Democrats, or the foreign policy establishment
more broadly had not yet reached the extreme it would, the ideological difference between the desires
of the Indonesia people, and thus its government, was not yet divergent from the goals and targets
of the Bush administration. However, this period of cooperation was not fated to last long term.
As Peter Beinart said, the War on Terror consensus collapsed very quickly. And with the collapse
of this consensus, and the chasm between the Democratic Party foreign policy and the increasingly
security-centric, unilateral Republican Party foreign policy, U.S.-Indonesian relations would suffer.
With the collapse of the War on Terror consensus, and the relative rightward shift of the Bush
administration’s foreign policy (both in methods and priorities), the wishes of the Indonesian people
became divergent from the wishes and actions of the Bush administration. Just quantitatively, this
can be seen with President Bush’s levels of support across the country. In 2006, according to 1,022
adults polled by Pew, 20.94 per cent of Indonesian’s polled had confidence in the president to “do
the right thing regarding world affairs”. In 2007, this number dropped to a dismal 14.39 per cent,
before rebounding slightly to 24.2 per cent in 2008 (Pew Research Center, 2018b).
This decline in support for President Bush can be tied to his increasingly unilateral War on
Terror policies, which flew in the face of the previous priorities of American foreign policy, such
as democratization, human rights, and multilateral institutional cooperation. A good example of
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Bush’s transition away from more established U.S. foreign policy came in 2005, when he issued a
National Security Waver to give military equipment to Indonesia to help quell unrest in Indonesia’s
Aceh region, overcoming objections from both Congress and a number of Indonesian human rights
groups. Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy, an author of legislation tying U.S. military assistance
to a country’s actions of human rights - even went so far to say about the waiver, “To waive on
national security groups a law that seeks justice for crimes against humanity. . . makes a mockery
of the process and sends a terrible message. The Indonesians will see it as a clean bill of heath”
(Kessler, 2005). Interestingly, the article also notes that “counterterrorism cooperation” and “re-
newed cooperation” with the FBI helped convince the administration to restore military ties. It
is also worth noting that this normalization of ties occurred only when President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono, a retired general, was elected president of Indonesia. Further, the Bush administration
pressed for removal of restrictions on U.S. support for the Indonesian army’s special forces, called
Kopassus, but these calls were unsuccessful. Kopassus was convicted of human rights violations in
1998 and earlier, terrorizing civilians, and kidnapping as well as murder of activists as late as 2002.
At the time, John Miller who served as the National Coordinator of ETAN, the East Timor and
Indonesia Action Network, said that “Working with Kopassus, which has a long history of terror-
izing civilians, will undermine those fighting for justice and accountability in Indonesia and East
Timor” (Asian American Press, 2010). The Bush administration proposed restarting U.S. training
of Kopassus in 2008, but the legal councel of the State Department ruled the Leahy Amendment
made this action illegal and no training ever took place. Many of the decisions Bush made regard-
ing foreign policy to Indonesia remain relevant today, as “the United States and Indonesia have
a defense relationship that has included a range of interactions including visits, exchanges, and
regular exercises, with previous major restrictions in place. . . largely lifted under the George W.
Bush administration” (Parameswaran, 2018).
The Kopassus incident and the Bush administration actions more broadly during the divergence
of Republican and Democratic foreign policies show the Bush administration priorities no longer
existing in lockstep with the desires of the Indonesian populace, but are far from being the only
examples. For instance, even as Indonesian’s soured on President Bush in 2006, 2007, and 2008,
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he continued pursuing his Republican, security-centric foreign policy, increased military assistance,
and increasing unilateralism - policies that democratic Indonesia didn’t support or want to be a
part of. And though the two countries were allies, in addition to poor poll numbers, Indonesia was
able to register their dissatisfaction with President Bush’s administration in other ways, such as
disagreeing with the United States by voting against them in the United Nations General Assembly.
A chart showing the contrast between levels of agreement between Indonesia and the Clinton ad-
ministration, the early Bush administration, and later Bush administration reveals that Indonesia
agreed with the United States’ foreign policy under Clinton and, to a lesser degree, early Bush,
before support dwindles. These later Bush years in the chart coincide with increasing levels of po-
larization domestically in the United States, as well as the widening divergence between Republican
foreign policy and Democratic foreign policy. Indonesia’s voting percentage with the United States
in the United Nations General Assembly “decreased 52 per cent, from 32.8 per cent in 1997 to 15.1
per cent in 2008.” Further, “The per centage of important votes decreased 72 per cent, from 27 per
cent in 1997 to 8.3 per cent in 2009.” Incredibly, “Indonesia did not at all agree with the United
States on any important UNGA votes in 2001, 2006, and 2007” (Graphics: US-Indonesia Relations,
2010: p.404).
Fortunately for both Indonesia and the United States, the headwinds of the relationship between
the two democracies would undergo a reversal with the incoming administration of President-elect
Obama. When asked the same question about Obama as was poised as about Bush - whether
Obama would “do the right thing regarding world affairs” - 70.6 per cent of Indonesians polled said
that they had confidence in the new U.S. President, a steep contrast from the 24.2 per cent a year
earlier for his predecessor.
While Obama may have benefitted from personal ties to Indonesia in that question - he spent
four of his childhood years in Jakarta - these ties cannot explain more than perhaps a small portion
of the massive uptick in positive views of Indonesians of the American president. In all democra-
cies, the election of Obama helped restore faith in the American government, to a much greater
degree than in more authoritarian countries. Rather, this paper posits that the improvement in
relations happened due to the realignment of the interests between both the democratic polity and
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government of Indonesia and the like-minded priorities of the new Democratic president.
Instead of a foreign policy with exclusive focus on security and pursuing Muslim extremists by
any means necessary, Obama made democratization, education, multilateralism, and trade center-
pieces of American foreign policy. Specifically in the case of Indonesia, this realignment took the
form of the Comprehensive Partnership, which negotiation began on in 2009. The centerpieces
of the agreement were over 165 million USD guaranteed for a Higher Education Partnership, 136
million USD towards environmental programs and cooperation to lessen greenhouse emissions, mea-
sures to strengthen democratic institutions and good governance, and promote free trade (White
House Press Secretary, 2010) (Murphy, 2010: p.380). These are priorities that were shared by both
the Democratic foreign policy and the democratic citizens and government of Indonesia.
Under Obama, relations between the two nations remained strong. The lowest rating Obama
received to the “faith in world affairs” question during his presidency was 52.9 per cent (Pew
Research Center, 2018b). During his time in office, Obama’s administration would pursue closer
ties with Indonesia on all fronts, not just security, and this led to him leaving office with a confidence
rating in that country just shy of when he entered, 65.8 per cent (Pew Research Center, 2018b).
In the short amount of time that President Trump has been in office, limited data has been
collected on his standing in Indonesia, though the preliminary results do not look promising for the
future of U.S./Indonesian relations. For instance, according to a poll conducted in 2016, only nine
per cent of Indonesians said Trump is better for Indonesia’s national interests, and only ten per
cent of Indonesians said they would have voted for Trump; an even more mediocre eight per cent
said Trump was better for Asia (Jaipragas, 2017). Pew found in 2017, only twenty-three per cent
of Indonesians have faith in President Trump to do the right thing (Pew Research Center, 2018b).
Trump’s deep personal unpopularity in Indonesia has to do in large part due to his attacks
on Muslims and the religion of Islam more broadly; having re-engaged in the Bush global security
foreign policy, albeit in a more xenophobic and nativist way, Trump has inflamed anti-American
sentiments across the whole of the Muslim world. Trump’s comments have not played well in
Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim country. Many of the core disagreements between
the denizens of Indonesia and President Trump are the same disagreements they had with the
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second President Bush, namely the security-centric foreign policy. However, overt anti-Muslim
attitudes and verbiage now work further against the young administration.
The Trump administration has so far mostly been worried about trade deficits and security
arrangements between the United States and its allies. President Trump’s priorities seem to be out
of lockstep with the desires of the Indonesian people and government - such as defense of human
rights and of democracy - resulting in a regression away from the heights of friendship experienced
between the two countries during the Obama administration. However, Brian Harding and Trevor
Sutton argue that:
. . . elite Indonesians and Malaysians perceive Trump and his Cabinet as less likely than
prior administrations to press them on human rights, corruption, and environmental
issues. In fact, many of our interlocutors remarked that political elites in both countries
related favorably to Trump’s blatant embrace of conflicts of interest and hoped it was
a sign that the U.S. president was amenable to a more transactional, less values-driven
bilateral relationship (Harding and Sutton, 2017).
Indonesia, a presidential republic according to the CIA World Factbook, shares more values
with the Democratic Party’s foreign policy than with the Republican policy, which is further to
the right on the ideological spectrum. And while the two countries have a working relationship
regardless of the party in charge of the White House, these different shared points of emphasis allow
for progress in different areas with different parties. Progress on both security and national defense
is a top priority of the Republican foreign policy, whereas education, human rights, climate change,
democratization, and other areas are the focuses of the more multifaceted Democratic foreign policy,
allowing for progress on a greater range of issues, as well as greater faith in the intentions of the
American government. Summarizing the relationship between Indonesia and the United States,
Ann Murphy writes that “The dynamics of US-Indonesian relations, therefore, are a function of the
extent to which Indonesian domestic and foreign policies are congruent with US strategic doctrine:
cooperation and amity prevail when they are, and conflict arises when they are not” (Murphy, 2010:
p.365). To this point, half of this paper’s hypothesis appears to be confirmed: democratic countries
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get along better with the Democratic Party’s foreign policy than the Republican Party’s foreign
policy.
II. Case Study: Vietnam
U.S.-Vietnam relations were normalized fairly recently, only in 1995 by President Clinton. The
circumstances surrounded this normalization, however, are slightly different than those surrounding
the flowering of the U.S.-Indonesian relationship. Vietnam today is “governed by a one-party,
authoritarian system that suppresses dissent, including from the political opposition, independent
religious communities, bloggers, journalists, and human rights advocates and lawyers” (Albert,
2018). Elections are managed by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), where only pre-approved
candidates can run. Critics of the government are liable to disappear, and opposition parties are
barred from competing in elections (Freedom House, 2018).
The stark contrast in political systems, governance, and ideology between Indonesia and Viet-
nam have resulted in a unique type of relationship between Vietnam in the United States. This
difference, largely explained and complicated by the unique history of the United States in Viet-
nam, makes it surprising that a seemingly amicable relationship has developed between the two
countries.
Due to Vietnam’s authoritarian orientation, that relationship is in many ways the opposite of the
one seen with Indonesia and the United States. Vietnam’s authoritarian government has much more
in common with, and more to gain from, the Republican security-centric foreign policy; therefore
one would expect that ties between the countries would improve under Republican presidents since
September 11, and suffer under Democratic presidents.
One difficulty in analyzing Vietnam is that the government strongly limits polling or other
forms of political expression by its citizens. Unlike Indonesia, Pew only has data on the opinions
of the Vietnamese polity from 2014, 2015, and 2017, making earlier analysis of U.S./Vietnamese
relations slightly more challenging. However, this problem can be overcome when the framework is
slightly changed. Vietnam’s regime, as a one-party communist dictatorship that nips any potential
opposition in the bud, is much less responsive to the wills and desires of its citizens than a democratic
government. As such, popular support matters less to the decision-makers of the Vietnamese
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government when constructing policy or conducting foreign policy - the leaders are more insulated.
Therefore, the lack of public polling data is inconvenient, but not problematic. What matters are
the sentiments and actions of the CPV leaders.
Vietnam had undergone drastic economic reforms prior to Bush’s inauguration. Vietnam’s cor-
responding rapid economic growth, growing middle class, and the rising specter of China’s increas-
ing geopolitical clout to the north made improved Vietnamese ties with both the United State’s
government and economy important to Vietnam’s future. High-level talks between Vietnamese
government officials and the Bush administration focused on trade and security, specifically with
regards to terrorism and China, the rise of the latter also motivating Vietnam to seek greater ties
with the United States regardless of ideological differences between the democratic country and the
authoritarian one. President Bush in particular would fail to use this advantageous situation in a
way that furthered the cause of democratization and human rights in Vietnam.
In 2007, well after the partisan divide regarding the War on Terror and each party’s respective
foreign policies began to reach maturity, President Bush hosted Vietnamese President Minh Triet
to the White House. It was the first time in over thirty years that a Vietnamese president was
invited to the White House. The talks centered on trade and security, and though President Bush
stated he raised human rights, the Vietnamese President Triet apparently had a different takeaway
from the conversation, saying,
Mr. President and I also had direct and open exchange of views on a matter that we
remain different, especially on matters related to religion and human rights, and our
approach is that we would increase our dialogue in order to have a better understanding
of each other...And we are also determined not to let those differences afflict our overall
larger interests (Associated Press, 2007).
This lack of emphasis placed on human rights and democratization follows the trends of the Bush
administration’s Republican foreign policy, which placed participation in American-led attempts
to fight terrorism worldwide above all other priorities. Vietnam was one of a handful of countries
that used the opportunity these changed ideals presented to obtain closer ties with America while
simultaneously using this newfound goodwill and changed American foreign policy priorities to crack
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down at home. In the Congressional Research Service’s 2009 report on U.S.-Vietnam relations, the
report notes that in 2007 - the same year as President Triet’s visit to the White House - the number
of arrests of political dissidents in Vietnam increased, indicating a worsening human rights situation
(Manyin, 2009). Further, the report states that “. . . the government has become more restrictive
toward criticism of the government over the past two to three years. Since early 2008, for instance,
press freedoms reportedly have been curtailed and prominent journalists arrested” (Manyin, 2009:
p.11).
In summary, under the Bush administration, ties between Vietnam and the United States
improved drastically, but only in issues the Vietnamese government and Republican foreign policy
had in common. Issues that were priorities previously in American foreign policy, such as democracy
promotion and human rights, were now merely given lip service, but were largely ignored by the
United States. In response, they began to be rolled back in many places.
President Obama’s personal popularity also carried over into Vietnam, where what little evi-
dence that exists suggests he was well-liked and his election well-received. It is worth noting that
Vietnam had long had pro-democracy protests, indicating a desire by at least some segments of
the population for a more democratic form of government and more personal rights; however, these
protests were quickly put down, as in 2007, and a stronger state-led security apparatus was insti-
tuted. Thus, although Obama and his foreign policy priorities may have been popular with the
Vietnamese people, they were at odds with the wishes of the Vietnamese government elites. And
since the average Vietnamese citizen has little ability to make their voices heard to the government,
it is the opinions of the governing elite in Vietnam that determined relations between Vietnam and
America during President Obama’s eight years in office.
However, the sheer importance for Vietnam in obtaining better ties with the United States - both
out of economic considerations and Chinese geopolitical fears - allowed President Obama to exact
some concessions from the Vietnamese government. The United States launched the U.S.-Vietnam
Comprehensive Partnership in 2013 with the goal of furthering America’s relationship with Vietnam
and vice versa. This agreement centered on a number of things - improving economic engagement,
actions to limit Chinese influence, fighting climate change - but also a critical emphasis on the
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promotion of human rights. In 2014, the government of Vietnam signed the Convention Against
Torture, and invited the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief to visit the
country (U.S. Department of State, 2013). Both of these vital steps were highly out of character
for a country that had been trending towards greater limitations on human rights, not less.
The likely reason for these surprise changes have to do with the value the Obama administration
placed on human rights and democratization, pressure that wasn’t there during Bush’s presidency.
Unlike during President Triet’s visit to Washington, President Obama was willing to push his
Vietnamese counterpart hard on the issue of democratization and human rights during his 2016
visit to Vietnam.
President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry invited a number of civil leaders in Vietnam for
a meeting “intended to send a message to the Vietnamese government leaders and public about the
need for democratic reforms” (Nakamura, 2016). Further, when several invitees - a journalist and
a candidate for the National Assembly who was under house arrest - were prevented from coming,
President Obama issued the following statement:
. . . your people’s potential, in part, derives from their ability to express themselves and
express new ideas, to try to right wrongs that are taking place in the society. And so
it’s my hope that, increasingly, the Vietnamese government, seeing the enormous strides
that the country is making, has more confidence that its people want to work together
but also want to be able to assemble and participate in the society in ways that will be
good for everybody in the long run (Nakamura, 2016).
Further, the date itself of Obama’s visit, initially scheduled to coincide with Vietnam’s elections
for its National Assembly and corresponding protests over corruption and pollution on May 21-23
2016, was moved likely out of fear that the U.S. president would further inflame the passions of
pro-democracy protests, very clearly at loggerheads with the wishes of the Vietnamese governing
elite.
It is true that the military and security aspect of the United State’s relationship with Vietnam
also progressed under President Obama; in 2014, the United States partially lifted its arms embargo
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on Vietnam. However, the lifting of this embargo, and other actions taken by the Obama admin-
istration, were not done in a vacuum; rather, as Carl Thayer writes, “It has been long-standing
U.S. policy to link lethal arms sales to Vietnam’s human rights record. Since the lifting of the
arms ban there has been intense discussion about these two intertwined issues” (Thayer, 2016).
Although the arms embargo was lifted, in addition to Vietnam’s decisions to both ratify the Con-
vention Against Torture and invite the U.N. Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief (promises
made by Vietnam to the United States when the Comprehensive Partnership was written that were
kept), Vietnam added amendments to its constitution on “human rights, freedom of religion, and
free speech, press, access to information, assembly, association, and demonstration” (Thayer, 2016).
The penal system was updated, and other steps taken to modernize Vietnam’s society. And while
the progress may not have been as transformative as the Democratic Obama administration would
like to have seen, substantial progress was made and made due to the pressure exerted by the
Democratic Party foreign policy.
It is also important to indicate that, although relations warmed between the two countries,
relations between the regimes remained cool. President Obama and members of his administration
would harshly criticize Vietnam’s government for human rights violations multiple times throughout
his presidency. In addition, it is likely that very few in the Vietnamese government agreed with
and were excited about Obama’s push for greater democratization and human rights in Vietnam.
However, the United States was a necessary ally to have against China, and due to the priorities of
the Democratic Party’s foreign policy, some concessions with regards to civic freedoms needed to be
made. The relationship was one of necessity and convenience, not pushed by ideological similarity
and affinity, as with George W. Bush in the latter years of his administration.
This relationship between the Vietnamese government and America, turned on its head when
Obama inherited power from Bush, again underwent a drastic shift with the election of President
Trump. And as expected, Trump’s Republican Party foreign policy has played very well in Vietnam.
According to Pew, “84 per cent of Vietnamese view America favorably. . . [up] 6 percentage points
from the end of the Obama years”(Taft, 2017). Further, “Vietnam is among seven out of 37 surveyed
countries where a majority of the population says they like Trump”, with the other countries being
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Israel, Kenya, Tanzania, Russia, Philippines, and Nigeria (Taft, 2017). It is worth noting that these
are all countries struggling with threats to their democracies, and have suffered from democratic
declines, just as Vietnam has undergone since Trump’s election.
The Trump administration has removed the pressure Vietnam’s government faced during the
Obama years to improve human rights and democratization. Human Rights Watch states that
“Vietnam’s repression of human rights and democracy activities increased significantly in 2017”
(Human Rights Watch, 2018). Vietnamese authorities
engaged in a renewed crackdown against rights activism, arresting dozens of bloggers
and activists and sentencing many to long prison terms. Basic rights including free-
dom of speech, assembly, association, movement, and religion remain severely restricted
in Vietnam’s one-party state. State-sanctioned thugs often attacked dissidents, while
police brutality, including deaths in police custody, remains a serious problem Human
Rights Watch (2018).
Also echoing President Triet’s visit to the White House in 2007, President Trump would come
under fire while attending a state dinner with Vietnamese President Tran Das Quang. In addition
to congratulating the Vietnamese president on an “outstanding” job, when asked if he thought it
was necessary to bring up human rights violations in Vietnam, President Trump said “Well, I do.
But I also raise issues on many other things” (Shelbourne, 2017). There is no evidence that he ever
actually raised human rights at all.
Human rights and democratization were not significant priorities of the Bush administration,
and even less in the Trump administration. During both of these administrations, human rights and
democracy suffered assaults which, to a large degree, were somewhat reversed under the Obama
administration’s foreign policy priorities. The same divide between Republican and Democratic
foreign policies that came into play in Indonesia also came into play in Vietnam. The difference
between the two examples is that Indonesia is a democracy with a different set of preferences that
much more greatly align with the Democratic foreign policy, and Vietnam is an authoritarian one-
party state which has preferences that much more greatly align with the Republican foreign policy.
This means, unlike Indonesia, relations between America and Vietnam are much more ideologically
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similar with Republican control over foreign policy, as evidenced by the quick rollback of human
rights upon the end of Obama’s terms in office, and subsequent blossoming of security ties.
III. Case Study: Thailand
Thailand has undergone more political transition than any of the other countries in this study.
Thailand is primarily a constitutional monarchy, but this statement is a gross oversimplification.
Thailand has had over seventeen constitutions and nineteen military coups, and the country has
ricocheted aggressively between being very democratic and very authoritarian. For the first part
of President Bush’s presidency, Thailand was a very open and democratic system, though this
would undergo and abrupt reversal with the 2006 Thai coup d’etat, with the military replacing
the government and forcing Prime Minister Thaksin into exile. Prior to fleeing, Thaksin was the
first democratically elected prime minister of Thailand, and had been reelected in 2005. During his
time in office, Thaksin pursued policies to expand healthcare coverage and reduce poverty, amongst
other priorities. The King during this period, King Bhumibol Adulyadej, would die in 2016.
The military, which had committed the coup, essentially made Thailand a dictatorship overnight:
upcoming elections were cancelled, martial law declared, and all political activity was banned, in-
cluding protests. More ominously, the leaders of the coup abolished the cabinet and parliament of
Thailand (BBC, 2006b).
Coups in Thailand are viewed differently than coups in many other countries. The monarchy in
Thailand is viewed as the only governmental absolute, and is hugely respected and influential. The
monarchy of Thailand is essentially sacrosanct, with every other part of Thailand’s government fluid
and subject to change. King Bhumibol was among the most revered in recent times (BBC, 2006b).
It is telling that one of General Sonthi Boonyaratglin’s first moves upon seizing power was to visit
the king and declare loyalty to him: the coup was not an attempt at seizing absolute power, but
merely the restoration of ‘stability’ to Thailand and the government under the king. This is the key
difference between Thai coups and coup in the normal sense of the word: Thai coups are perceived
by Thais as never about absolute power, but promoting stability and peace of the country. As
such, coups aren’t viewed in the same light by Thai citizens as we would expect in other countries:
they are part of the natural ebb-and-flow of governance. It is, however, disappointing that a
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coup was launched during Thailand’s longest uninterrupted period of substantive improvement in
democratization, preventing the necessary norms and values from taking root.
Those elements involved in conducting the coup viewed themselves not as power hungry war-
mongers, but as forces of stability, progress and fairness. The leaders of the coup would release a
number of communiques, with one reading,
It has been clear that the administration of the country’s affairs by the current caretaker
government has created conflicts and division, and sowed discord among the people of
the nation. It is unprecedented in the history of the Thai nation that groups were
determined to win through ways and means. The trend is getting more violent every
day. . . It is necessary for the Administrative Reform Group under the Democratic
System with the King as the Head of State, comprising commanders of the armed
forces and the National Police Bureau, to seize national administrative power from now
on. In so doing, the Administrative Reform Group under the Democratic System with
the King as the Head of State wishes to reaffirm that it has no intention to become the
administrators of the country. The administrative power under the democratic system
with the king as the head of the state will be returned to the Thai people as quickly as
possible (BBC, 2006a).
This was a rare coup where the promise of a quick return to the pre-coup status quo was actually
achieved by the incoming regime. In addition, it is rumored that the king himself played a key role
in encouraging the coup, disgruntled with Prime Minister Thaksin’s actions while in office.
Thailand would make substantial progress improving its democracy and democratic freedoms in
the aftermath of the 2006 coup, remaining a democracy through the remainder of Bush’s presidency
and through all of Obama’s first term and half of his second, with the next lapse into authoritarian-
ism coming with another coup in 2014. This coup was allegedly prompted by perceived inefficiencies
and power struggles within the government headed by Yingluck Shinawatra. This time, the effects
of the coup would be much more protracted and the junta, especially after the election of Trump,
felt no pressure to immediately restore democracy, repeatedly deferring the dates of future national
elections.
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Thailand represents the extremes of both ends of the political spectrum. According to Polity,
Thailand has been both more democratic than Indonesia from 2000-2005, and almost as author-
itarian as Vietnam in both 2006 and 2014-on. This situation allows for a unique case study of
how these differing levels of having either an authoritarian or democratic regime affects ties with
the United States. It is also worth noting that democracy isn’t viewed as the ultimately desirable
form of government in Thailand - it is viewed as more of an indulgence allowed by elites in the
military and the monarchy. Democracy, to many Thais, is something the people want, but just like
parents limit candy with children, elites need to limit and control it as democracy can ultimately
be unhealthy in too large doses. This viewpoint has had a substantial impact on how democratic
freedoms and human rights are viewed by many Thais.
When President Bush began took office, he was dealing with a reportedly democratic Thailand.
Diplomatic relations began to deteriorate as Thailand experienced its 2006 coup, largely brought on
by by Prime Minister Thaksin’s policies, which were redistributive and liberal in nature, reflecting
Thaksin’s immense popularity with the poor and more rural sectors of Thai society.
It is against this background that ties between the two countries seemed to be on a downward
trajectory with Paul Chambers writing, “Three years ago [2001], the United States and Thailand
seemed headed for a more strained and distant relationship” (Chambers, 2004: p.460). The liberal
bent of Thaksin’s policies, combined with his populist, nationalist and anti-foreign platform wedged
a divide between Thailand and the United States. Thaksin was elected in 2000, prior to the
final divide between Republican and Democratic foreign policies due to both polarization and
the War on Terror; human rights and democratization were still shared priorities in both foreign
policies, explaining why when Thaksin’s administration began “de-emphasizing human rights and
democratization”, a Republican president (President Bush) took issue with these changes and the
relationship between the two countries deteriorated.
After an initial, and somewhat muddled, response to the United States following the September
11th attacks, Thaksin and his government began assisting the U.S. with its War on Terror and
diplomatic ties began to improve. Although outwardly expressing sentiments towards neutrality
(necessary due to Thai Muslims, a substantial voting bloc), Thaksin “pledged full support for the
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United States in whatever action it intended to take against terrorist groups.” Thailand “granted
the U.S. over-flight rights, the right to refuel aircraft and allowed U.S. ships to visit Thai ports
all in support of U.S. Operation “Enduring Freedom” (Chambers, 2004: p.466). Thaksin would
visit Bush in 2001 and promise further Thai cooperation in the War on Terror. Yet, despite these
acts, Thaksin foot-dragged where possible, hoping to appear helpful to his main ally yet remain
officially unaligned. The Thai posture was insufficient for the Bush administration, and the situation
changed in 2003 following several terrorsist attacks and incontrovertible evidence that Al-Qaeda
and its affiliates were operating in Thailand. Thaksin would even send several Thai battalions to
Iraq, and another 443 troops in 2003 (Chambers, 2004: p.469).
Thaksin, a shrewd manipulator in his own right, recognized that his alliance in Bush’s war
allowed him freedom to operate at home, and he took fully advantage launching campaigns to
control both Thailand’s domestic and foreign media, and beginning a large, extra-judicial “war
against drugs”. And, although other members of the United States government complained about
these human rights violations, Thaksin gambled correctly that the head of the American government
- President Bush - would not. During Thaksin’s 2003 visit to Washington, “President Bush did not
publicly mention the extra-judicial killings, instead praising the campaign’s success. Washington
appeared willing to ignore Thailand’s human right record in return for closer cooperation against
terrorism and Iraq” (Chambers, 2004: p.472).
Participation in the War on Terror was the most important issue for the Bush administration
when it came to deciding if a country was friend or foe. Thailand’s participation and assistance
made them, at least until 2006, a steadfast American ally even as Thailand’s human rights situation
deteriorated. However, the Thai military’s seizure of, and then unwillingness to hold power long-
term doesn’t make Thailand an autocracy: it was merely not a democracy. Bush would finish his
term in office with Thailand’s reliability as an ally, or even future, in great doubt.
President Obama took a different tact towards Thailand during his tenure in office. Rarely would
he or members of his administration discuss Thailand without mentioning the importance of a return
to democracy and human rights in that country. The reaction by the Obama administration to
Thailand’s 2014 coup was different than that of the Bush administration. Many had seen the Bush
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reaction as lacking, given that funding for “law enforcement training, counterterrorism” and other
initiatives remained in place, even during a coup (Chanlett-Avery, Dolven, and Mackey, 2015: p.3).
In 2014, the United States immediately ended 4.7 million USD in military assistance and training
exercises with Thailand, and also cancelled visits from Thai military leaders (Parameswaran, 2015).
This occurred immediately after U.S. military funding to Thailand returned to 2006 levels, following
Thailand’s return, at least somewhat, to democratic rule.
In addition, strong calls for a return to democracy following the 2014 coup were made by
very prominent members of Obama’s administration, such as John Kerry who stated “There is no
justification for this coup. . . I urge the the restoration of civilian government immediately, a return
to democracy, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as press freedoms”
(Chanlett-Avery, Dolven, and Mackey, 2015: p.2). In fact, the pressure exerted by Washington
on Thailand due to its suppression of democracy, the media, political expression, and other rights
would push the 180 year old U.S.-Thai relationship to what some people considered a breaking
point: statements made by Daniel Russel, U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, condemning restrictions on civil liberty, the political process, and an end to martial
law, would elicit a strong and angry response from the normally soft-spoken junta leader General
Prayut Chan-o-cha. President Obama would continue to push the issue, with it being written in his
2015 National Security Strategy that “We will uphold our treaty obligations to. . . .Thailand, while
encouraging the latter to return quickly to democracy” (National Security Strategy, 2015: p.24).
The pressure exerted by the Obama administration for Thailand to return to a democratic path
dissipated the moment President Trump was elected. Sheldon Simon writes that “Thailand and
the US restored military relations with the Trump administration abandoning Obama’s pressure
to restore a democratic process” (Simon, 2018: p.48). Elections previously planned to restore
Thailand to a democracy following the 2014 coup were repeatedly delayed. They were held on
February 24th in 2019, but were neither free nor fair, with the military retaining power. A joint
statement released by President Trump and Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha included only a
single reference to democracy in a document filled with platitudes praising the military alliance
and the need to confront terrorism and insecurity wherever it may be. The sentence was “President
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Trump welcomed Thailand’s commitment to the roadmap, which, upon completion of relevant
organic laws as stipulated by the constitution, will lead to free and fair elections in 2018”, yet
as soon as General Prayut landed back in Thailand, the Prime minister clarified that “President
Trump didn’t ask me about the issue” (White House Press Secretary, 2017) (Cochrane, 2017).
Under Trump, ties between the ruling elites in both the United States and Thailand, specifically
in the form of the military junta, have improved markedly in the areas of security, combatting terror,
and other important areas. Similarly, relations between the two nations improved under President
Bush, especially after the commencement of the War on Terror. However, the cost of improved
ties in these areas has been complete abandonment of any pressure for a return to a democracy
or improvement in human rights from the United States, such as imposed during the Obama
administration. The stark contrast between Republican foreign policy priorities and Democratic
foreign policy priorities are clearly understood by Thailand’s leadership.
IV. Case Study: The Philippines
The United States and the Philippines have a very long and interconnected history. Initially ceded
to the United States following the Spanish-American war, the United States would suppress efforts
for Philippine independence in 1899. After a short Japanese occupation in World War II, the
Philippines would gain their independence from the United States in 1946. The origins of the
relationship left a strong impact, and the Philippines would adopt a governmental structure very
similar to that of the United States, and this democratic system would work well until the election
of Ferdinand Marcos. When Marcos was forced out of office in 1986, the democratic system would
resume. This system has continued to this day, though it has recently come under attack from the
current president of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte.
This cultural affinity, combined with the Philippines being the only majority-Christian country
in the region (excepting East Timor), serves as the bedrock of the Philippine-American alliance.
The Philippines were one of the first countries around the world to answer the United States’s
call for assistance in the War on Terror, granting both over-flight rights for military aircraft, as
well as air fields and Subic Naval Base for refueling. This quick agreement with American foreign
policy priorities earned Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo high praise from President
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Bush himself; he singled her out in a six-month anniversary speech of the September 11th terrorist
attacks as“Courageously opposing the threat of terror”. Further, President Bush proposed a further
92.3 million USD in military equipment to increase the Philippine’s counterterrorism capabilities
(Banlaoi, 2002). Decisions made by both leaders prompted Rommel Banlaoi to write that“President
Arroyo’s full support for the U.S.-led war on terrorism and strong commitment to the United
States in combating the terrorist network in Southeast Asia reinvigorated Philippine-American
ties” (Banlaoi, 2002: p.295).
As mentioned previously, Republican and Democratic foreign policies didn’t diverge until the
War on Terror reached a more mature phase: during the initial stages, President Bush’s efforts to
combat terror worldwide were supported by a large bipartisan majority. As such, there was little
divergence between Republican and Democratic foreign policy, meaning the priorities of President
Bush’s Republican foreign policy and the country more broadly matched President Arroyo’s neatly.
Further, President Bush’s reputation as a “crusading Christian cowboy” was not a weight around
the neck for him in the Philippines as it was in other countries, due to the Philippine’s religious
makeup. The United States would also launch multiple joint-operations with Filipino special forces
in Philippine territory to neutralize numerous terror leaders.
This extensive cooperation, combined with the Philippines managing to avoid the global eco-
nomic downturn of 2008, and combined with the Philippine’s Christian background, all helped keep
approval of both President Bush and the United States higher than in other countries. There were
few human rights violations in the Philippines to test this relationship and possibly antagonize,
and as a result, the divergence in Republican and Democratic foreign policies that proved so salient
in other situations failed to play a substantial role in the Philippines. This is evidenced by the
Philippines being one of only two nations polled by the BBC out of twenty-one countries that said
President Bush’s reelection was a net positive for peace and security in the world (62 per cent
answered this way) (Program on International Policy Attitudes, 2014).
Yet, even as external events helped support President Bush’s flagging approval figures in the
Philippines relative to the rest of the world, that figure is much lower than the rockstar approval
figures President Obama would obtain in the Philippines - at the highest point, President Obama
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obtained an incredible 94 per cent confidence rating in the country. This proves that even though
Bush remained more popular in the Philippines than in almost any other democracy around the
world, the divergence between his views and emphases on issues such as human rights and democ-
ratization (and other issues) continued to contrast with those of the citizens of the Philippines,
despite unusually high support for a Republican president (due to external and unique factors) and
their foreign policy priorities in a democratic country.
Yet for Obama’s high popularity in the Philippines, the country and administration had minimal
pressing issues to attend to, and the relationship remained amicable until the election of Duterte.
Jeffrey Bader writes that, prior to 2013, “The administration had no urgent matters to attend to
in the Philippines” (Bader, 2012: p.101). Prior to this point, the United States and the Philippines
worked in lockstep both to limit China, fight terror, and promote democracy and human rights.
Obama met with Presidents Arroyo and Aquino in 2009 and 2010 respectively. In joint remarks,
Obama and Arroyo both commented on the importance of pushing back against human rights
violations; in his presser with President Aquino, topics ranged from environmental protections
to trade and promoting good governance. There was very little disagreement between the two
countries, either rhetorically or in actuality, as the priorities shared by the democratic government
of the Philippines saw eye-to-eye with the priorities of Obama’s Democratic foreign policy.
However, the tranquility in relations between nations was not to last the entirety of Obama’s
second term: the Philippines would have their Trump moment before America, electing bombastic
firebrand Rodrigo Duterte. Similar to Trump, Rodrigo Duterte was elected on a ‘law and order’
platform. Despite the Philippine’s successful democracy, crime and corruption are parts of daily
life in the Philippines, and Duterte was elected as the antidote to these problems. A former mayor
of Davao City, Duterte cut his teeth as a politician by brutally cracking down on crime, both in
the city and nationally. In both instances, he was very public about his enthusiasm for extra-
judicial killings; according to some estimates by major news outlets in the Philippines, Duterte is
responsible for more than twelve thousand deaths (Suerte-Felipe, 2018).
Perhaps unsurprisingly, President Obama and President Duterte had a poor relationship after
Duterte called Obama a “son of a whore” after Obama criticized his extrajudicial killings. He has
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since apologized (Associated Press, 2016).
There is global consternation as to the long-term effects Duterte’s presidency will have on
the Philippine’s democracy, but he appears to accept the Philippine’s current system and doesn’t
wish to change it. He has gone so far to say that “I have no illusions of occupying this office
one day longer than what the Constitution under which I was elected permits or under whatever
constitution there might be” (Placido, 2018). However, even if he accepts the current political
order, he has authoritarian tendencies and has found a close friend in Trump. Their priorities -
combatting terror and insecurity through whatever means necessary - has led to close agreement
ideologically, even as both presidents are hemmed in by the political systems of their countries.
President Trump has said he and Duterte “had a great relationship”, briefly endorsed Duterte’s
tactics of death for dealing drugs, and has repeatedly expressed sympathy for and agreement with
his Filipino colleague. Crucially, when visiting Manila, human rights were not raised at any point
in conversations between the two leaders (Holmes, 2017).
However, despite its president’s actions, the Philippines are still a democracy, and despite their
president’s affinity for Trump, Trump is much less popular in the Philippines, and many fewer
Filipinos have faith in him when compared to his predecessor. In 2015, Pew recorded confidence
in Obama to do the right thing by Filipinos at 94 per cent; Trump would begin 2017 at 69 per
cent (Pew Research Center, 2018b). And despite Duterte’s best attempts to pour cold water on the
Philippines’s relationship with America, polling shows that “Philippine confidence in US leadership
remains strong. . . Similarly, the AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] remain stalwarts of the
US-Philippine alliance”. And despite Duterte’s stated desire for all US Special Forces personnel to
leave the country, there to fight terror, they remain.
The relationship between the United States and the Philippines illustrates an interesting aspect
of this paper’s hypothesis: what happens when two countries have political systems and citizens
that tend to believe one foreign policy path or ideological belief, but have leaders that don’t? The
United States is a country in which the majority of Americans believe in democracy and human
rights, yet has a president that doesn’t place great emphasis in either. The Philippines are in
the same boat. When both countries had leaders that shared these beliefs, for instance Obama
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and Aquino, relations were good. Both countries are still democratic and believe largely the same
thing, yet leaders have arisen that don’t. So far, Trump and Duterte have been contained by the
democratic systems they inherited. This divide lays bare the impact of specific leaders on foreign
policy versus political systems and the beliefs of a country’s population at large. So far, the latter
has proved dominant.
Summary, Conclusions, and Major Findings
The case studies critically examined in this study, relative to Democrats, Republican presidents in
the post-September 11th era cooperate more readily and easily with authoritarian regimes due to
ideological and governing orientation of Republican Party foreign policy. Compared to Democratic
Party Presidents, Republican Presidents appear to enjoy a better rapport with the authoritarian
leaders - whether they head an authoritarian country, or have the same beliefs as an authoritarian
leader - whereas Democratic presidents get along better with democracies, both in actuality and
ideologically.
It is important to state that these comparisons are relative, i.e. Obama is more popular in
Indonesia relative to Trump; both could still be unpopular or popular. In the case studies above,
this rarely is the case but I believe this trend will hold true to other countries and regions of the
world if further research is done. One must be careful of factors specific to a certain country -
the predominantely Catholic population of the Philippines matching well with President Bush’s
‘crusading Christian cowboy’ global reputation, for instance - possibly affecting this relationship,
but the underlying pillars of the relationship still exist.
Further, the above hypothesis posits an interesting addendum to the overarching theory of
ideological difference: namely, countries that are on the same end of the political spectrum from
authoritarian to liberal tend to feel greater affinity for and less suspicious of countries that are
similar to them: the United States, for instance, cooperates better with Canada than with North
Korea. This paper finds an important addendum. The opinions of political leaders or parties, and
the ideologies they represent, matter. It is possible for a country on one end of the spectrum - a
country like the United States, which is fundamentally a democracy - to vacillate between which
countries it feels most comfortable ‘doing business with’. Government structure isn’t everything:
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leaders and their beliefs, parties, domestic situations, and ideology matter.
But the above changes are insignificant to the more important takeaway from this paper: polar-
ization in the United States has permeated American governance to such a degree that half of the
country is alright doing business with one half of the ideological spectrum, and the other half isn’t
and vice versa. While domestic politics have always affected foreign policy, Senator Vandenberg
expressed the dominant thinking of his era well when he said politics ended at the water’s edge,
at least on substantive matters. That attitude no longer exists. Foreign policy should benefit the
country, not just a party. But now the party in charge, and its ideology, determines what deals
are made, how they are made, and with whom. Deals made by the preceding administration are
now fair game to re-negotiate or outright cancel if they are contrary to the wishes of the base
of the new ruling party. More crucially, other countries understand this dysfunction in American
government and know, instantly, if they should expect an acrimonious relationship with the the
President elected in any cycle, or a cooperative one.
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